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Is All Politics Local? 
Determinants of Local 
and National Election 
Campaigns
Colm A. Fox1
Abstract
In recent decades election campaigns have shifted their focus from the 
local to the national level, increasingly featuring party leaders, labels, and 
national platforms. Despite this trend, there remains significant variation in 
the local/national orientation of campaigns across countries and parties. This 
article tests several propositions on why campaigns adopt a local or national 
orientation by analyzing a unique collection of more than 12,000 geocoded 
Thai election posters. Specialized software was used to measure the spatial 
proportions of visual and textual content on each poster. Using Thailand’s 
mixed electoral system to enable a controlled comparison of electoral rules, I 
demonstrate that proportional rules were associated with national campaign 
strategies whereas majoritarian rules fostered local strategies. In addition, 
large parties ran party-centered, policy-focused campaigns whereas small 
parties relied more on their leader’s image. This contrasts with Western 
countries, where large parties increasingly promote their leader’s image and 
small parties emphasize narrower policy objectives.
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The familiar adage “all politics is local” implies that parties’ and candidates’ 
success is closely tied to their ability to serve local interests and attend to 
local issues. When politics is local, voters and election campaigns revolve 
around such attributes as candidates’ character, constituent service, personal 
networks, and ability to deliver patronage. In contrast, when politics is 
national, voters and campaigns focus on national issues, party platforms, 
and party leaders.
Traditionally, election campaigns are multilevel, operating on both 
national and local levels (Zittel & Gschwend, 2008, p. 978). However, litera-
ture on the modernization of campaigns indicates that politics has become 
less local and more national. Among other things, this trend entails more 
centralized organization around a small group of leaders and consultants, 
heavier use of mass media, and the personalization of party leaders (Farrell & 
Webb, 2002; McAllister, 2007; Norris, 2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; 
Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Mancini & Swanson, 1996). Although national 
campaigns are more likely to produce parties with national policy programs, 
they can also be impersonal and decrease voter turnout because they rely 
largely on advertising, the mass media, and images of distant leaders rather 
than on local contacts (Green & Smith, 2003). In contrast, campaigns that 
revolve around local politics and candidates can strengthen the tie between 
voters and representatives and increase accountability, but they can also fos-
ter particularism and elevate the candidate’s personal appeal above the party, 
weakening partisan identities.
Given the importance of this topic, it is valuable to consider what factors 
contribute to nationally or locally oriented campaigns. More specifically, why 
do some campaigns feature national policies and issues, party labels, and party 
leaders while others focus on local concerns? In this article, I use an innova-
tive methodology to test several propositions on why campaigns adopt a local 
or national orientation, drawing on a unique collection of more than 12,000 
election posters photographed across Thailand during its 2011 national elec-
tions. Specialized software was used to measure the spatial ratios of visual and 
textual content from each poster, allowing me to compare the prominence of 
local candidates in posters with more national elements, including the party’s 
label, policy platform, national leader, and party slogans.
This creative empirical strategy offers several advantages. First, the use of 
the Thai case allows me to test the impact of electoral rules on campaigns 
while controlling for other mitigating factors. There is an extensive literature 
on the influence of electoral rules on campaigns, particularly the difference 
between single-member plurality (SMP; or majoritarian) systems and party-
list proportional representation (PR) systems (e.g., Carey & Shugart, 1995; 
Karvonen, 2010; Katz, 1980; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Roper, Holtz-Bacha, 
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& Mazzoleni, 2004). Thailand uses a mixed electoral system, permitting me 
to observe strategic campaign strategies under both majoritarian rules (used 
to elect constituency MPs) and proportional rules (used to elect party-list 
MPs) while holding other variables constant.1 This overcomes the problems 
associated with comparing campaigns across different countries or time peri-
ods, which can introduce other uncontrolled time- or country-specific 
factors.
Second, the Thai case allows me to test variation in campaign strategies 
across parties in an emerging democracy with weakly institutionalized par-
ties. Most systematic studies on campaigns have focused on a small number 
of Western democracies where programmatic parties were forged out of his-
torical social cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Less research has been 
done on emerging democracies where parties lack partisan support and 
instead often depend on traditional clientelistic practices. Studying party 
campaign behavior in an emerging democracy can shed light on the similari-
ties with and differences from party behavior in advanced democracies.
Third, this study can help to answer important questions regarding Thai 
politics. Since the adoption of a new constitution in 1997, a debate has arisen 
over the degree to which candidate-centered, locally oriented, patronage-
based campaigns have been replaced by party-centered, nationally oriented, 
policy-based campaigns. In addition, claims that politics is more localized 
and personalistic in north and northeast Thailand than in Bangkok, the coun-
try’s major urban center, have not been empirically tested. Understanding the 
impact of institutional design on Thai politics is all the more urgent, given 
recent constitutional reforms that represent a concerted effort to roll back the 
1997 provisions.
Finally, my approach introduces an innovative method of analyzing a data 
set of more than 12,000 election posters, which represent an important but 
severely understudied form of campaigning in emerging democracies. I 
develop new techniques to measure the prominence and substance of textual 
and visual information in posters. The fine-grained data generated by this 
method allow me to compare campaigns across electoral rules (as different 
posters targeted either constituency votes or party-list votes), across parties, 
and across regions. Ultimately, the use of a controlled comparison of real-
world campaign data strengthens the validity of this study.
The study has three main findings. First, in line with institutional theory, 
majoritarian rules fostered local candidate-centered campaigns, whereas PR 
rules nationalized and centralized campaigns around party labels, policies, 
leaders, and slogans. Second, party size affected the form of campaigns. 
Large parties actively sought constituency and party-list votes through cen-
tralized, party-centered, and nationally oriented campaigns. Medium-sized 
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parties downplayed their leader’s image, focusing instead on party-list candi-
dates and regionally oriented policies. Meanwhile, small parties campaigned 
for party-list votes by conducting campaigns that prominently featured the 
personalized image of the party leader. Finally, aside from a more personable 
style of campaigning in rural areas, regional differences had less impact on 
campaigns.
Local and National Campaigns
Election campaigns are critical periods for democracies. The local or national 
orientation of a campaign can influence the strength of parties and candi-
dates, their responsiveness to local and national problems, and the elector-
ate’s ability to hold them accountable. On one hand, campaigns can be 
decentralized and local, with candidates setting up and financing their own 
campaign organizations, using regional media outlets to address local issues, 
and drawing support from personal networks. On the other hand, campaigns 
can be centralized and national, with party leaders, consultants, and large 
donors organizing and financing the campaign, using the mass media to com-
municate positions on national issues, and pursuing support from partisans 
and broad sections of the electorate.
Previous research has indicated a shift in recent years toward more cen-
tralized, nationally oriented campaigns. Parties have become more profes-
sional and scientific in their approach to campaigns and have increasingly 
centralized their activities at the national level (Farrell & Webb, 2002; Katz 
& Mair, 1995; Norris, 2000; Mancini & Swanson, 1996). Often, a small 
group of media and policy specialists direct a campaign, relying on polls 
and focus groups to craft a consistent national policy platform for the party 
and a set of campaign messages that are then disseminated nationally 
through various media outlets.2 Studies of “centralizing personalization”3 
have also found that the importance of the party leader’s image has risen in 
recent years and that campaigns increasingly focus on the leader’s character 
or personality (McAllister, 2007; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Rahat & Sheafer, 
2007). However, some recent empirical findings have been more mixed 
(Karvonen, 2010; Kriesi, 2012). Less work has been done on “decentraliz-
ing personalization,” which focuses on the rising importance of candidates’ 
image, character, or personality in campaigns, so we have few points of 
comparison.4
Scholars have attributed the increased centralization of campaigns and the 
rising prominence of leaders to a decline in partisanship, advances in media 
(particularly television and the Internet), the rise of data-driven campaign 
techniques, and the use of professional consultants (Dalton, McAllister, & 
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Wattenberg, 2000; Farrell & Webb, 2002; Lang & Lang, 2002; Mancini & 
Swanson, 1996). Although these factors help us to interpret change over time, 
they are less useful in explaining variation in campaigns across or within 
countries. In particular, because most of the work to date has been on 
advanced democracies, we know less about the factors driving locally or 
nationally oriented campaigns in emerging democracies. Below I discuss 
what we know on the impact of three key factors: electoral rules, political 
parties, and urban–rural distinctions.
Explaining the Local and National Orientation of 
Campaigns
Electoral Rules: Majoritarian Versus Proportional
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in how electoral rules affect 
election campaigns. It has been theorized that intraparty competition is a key 
factor in making politics more local because it fosters candidate-centered 
campaigns at the constituency level (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Hicken, 2007; 
Katz, 1986). Intraparty competition occurs under various kinds of rules that 
force candidates to compete with copartisans. Open-list PR is the best known 
system that fosters intraparty competition and it is used in Brazil, Poland, and 
Indonesia.5 Because candidates need to distinguish themselves from coparti-
sans under this system, they are strongly motivated to promote their personal 
reputation, not just their party’s affiliation and national policy platform. As a 
result, campaigns become more candidate-centric when intraparty competi-
tion increases and more party-centered and program-based when it is removed 
(Catalinac, 2016). Although intraparty competition can contribute to local-
ized election campaigns, it is not a necessary condition.
To some degree, almost all majoritarian campaigns are personalized 
because they highlight the candidate’s individual role (Mancini & Swanson, 
1996, p. 17). Under SMP systems, citizens cast votes for an individual candi-
date, not a party; there are fewer candidates to choose from (compared with 
elections in multimember districts), and only one of them can win, becoming 
the constituency’s sole representative. Because there is a clear line of local 
accountability and because voters have more knowledge of the candidates, 
candidates have incentives to promote their personal attributes and attend to 
local interests. Indeed, the ability to hold representatives personally account-
able on local issues is a major advantage of majoritarian systems.
Compared with their counterparts in advanced democracies, constituency 
candidates in emerging democracies are even more likely to run localized, 
candidate-centric campaigns. Parties in emerging democracies are often 
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weakly institutionalized. They usually lack deep organizational structures at 
the local level, have limited funds to support constituency-level campaigns, 
and have weak partisan support. As a result, the bulk of the responsibility to 
organize and finance campaigns, as well as to foster local support, falls on 
the candidate. As they are relying predominantly on their own rather than on 
the party’s resources, candidates have stronger incentives and more leeway 
to campaign on their local personal reputation (Carey & Shugart, 1995; 
Samuels, 1999).
In contrast, PR elections tend to incentivize national campaign strategies. 
In PR systems with multiseat districts, seats are awarded proportionally, so 
even parties with marginal support can pick up some seats. This opportunity 
encourages parties to broaden their campaigns beyond those areas where they 
have a reasonable chance of winning a plurality of votes. In party-list PR 
systems, the desire to campaign across large multiseat districts (rather than in 
single-member districts) fosters greater centralization in how parties organize 
campaigns (Bowler & Farrell, 1992; Katz, 1980; Plasser & Plasser, 2002). 
This higher degree of campaign centralization often gives the party leader 
greater control in organizing the campaign and makes the leader’s image 
more central in it (Farrell & Webb, 2002).
The national orientation of campaigns is further enhanced when PR party-
lists are closed instead of open. With closed-list PR, voters select a party 
rather than a candidate and there is no intraparty competition. In this way, the 
party becomes more salient to voters, and parties thus have incentives to pro-
mote a party reputation, often through policy (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2003, 
p. 590). The size of the electoral district also matters. When compared with 
multiple regional districts, a single national district offers stronger incentives 
for parties to centralize and project a truly national orientation.
The combination of closed lists and a large electoral district also affects 
the campaign activities of individual party-list candidates, strongly encour-
aging them to campaign on the party’s reputation. As the size of the district 
increases (either geographically or in terms of magnitude), candidates’ 
incentive to promote a personal reputation declines. This is because the 
party-list candidate’s individual campaign effort will have less impact on his 
or her probability of securing a seat (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Shugart, 
Valdini, & Suominen, 2005). Overall, under closed-list PR, the fate of party-
list candidates is tied to the electoral success of their party. This offers strong 
incentives for these candidates to work together on a unified party-centered 
campaign.
From this discussion, we can generally expect more local, candidate-cen-
tered campaigns when the electoral rules foster intraparty competition. 
However, even under majoritarian rules that lack intraparty competition, 
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campaigns can be quite localized, particularly in emerging democracies with 
weakly institutionalized parties. In contrast, closed-list PR systems foster 
more centralization and nationalization of campaigns, particularly when the 
whole nation is the electoral constituency.
Political Party Size
An extensive literature on the development of parties in Western nations 
since the 19th century indicates a move from elite toward mass socialist, 
nationalist, and religious parties. Since the 1960s, however, the social base of 
mass parties have been undermined by a decline in trade unions, and a rise in 
secularization. In addition, there is less need for a deep organizational party 
structure due to the introduction of television, which has made it much easier 
for party leaders to communicate directly with voters. These socioeconomic 
and technological changes have given rise to catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 
1966), and more recently to smaller niche parties or movements.6 Large 
catch-all and small niche parties differ in how they appeal to voters, largely 
due to the size and composition of their support base.
Catch-all parties have a shallow organization, a lack of explicit ideology, 
a centrist orientation, and prominent leadership. For these parties, the goal is 
to win elections and govern, so they need to appeal to a larger, more diverse 
set of voters with a wide range of interests.7 As a result, they favor broad 
policies and often take vague issue positions that can shift depending on 
public sentiment. The relative lack of an explicit ideology prompts voters to 
focus on the personal attributes of their candidates and leaders, resulting in 
a greater degree of personalization in their election campaigns (Gunther & 
Diamond, 2003).
In contrast to the mainstream catch-all parties, smaller niche parties like 
the Greens, Communists, and extreme right-wing nationalist parties have 
strong, clearly articulated policy objectives (D’Alimonte, 1999; Kitschelt, 
1994). Potential voters for these small parties tend to be quite homogeneous 
and strongly policy-oriented, so small parties can be unambiguous and firm 
in their positions (Wagner, 2011). In fact, compromising on policy can be 
detrimental for these small parties, because it can cause internal divisions 
and cost them the support of activists who play vital roles in campaigning 
for the party (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006). The impact of party 
size has been shown to have an effect on campaign appeals in empirical 
studies in the West. For example, Dumitrescu (2010) found that small par-
ties focus their campaigns on informing voters about the party’s core 
issue(s), whereas larger parties more heavily emphasize the image of their 
candidates or leaders.
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Due to substantial differences in historical and socioeconomic factors, 
however, we cannot simply assume that party size will have the same effect 
in emerging democracies. In contrast to Western nations, these countries 
often have deeper ethnic cleavages, suffer from higher rates of poverty and 
illiteracy, and have yet to develop postmaterialistic values. Their political 
parties are also relatively new and did not experience the mass party era, 
which fostered partisanship. Instead, parties in these nations have generally 
grown out of traditional bonds and clientelistic networks, resulting in a prev-
alence of personalistic, ethnic, and catch-all parties throughout the develop-
ing world.
As in the West, the large parties are often catch-all (and multiethnic) in 
nature, promoting broad national policies and prominent leaders, but they 
also draw on patron–client networks. Regional parties are also common in 
emerging democracies. Somewhat smaller than the national parties, they are 
rooted in regional patron–client networks and regional ethnic identity groups. 
Their campaigns often focus on promises by local politicians to represent the 
interests of regional groups, mainly by increasing access to resources from 
the center. Finally, small parties rarely reflect the issue-oriented niche parties 
of the West. Instead, small parties largely serve as vehicles for local notables 
to get elected, and as a result, their campaigns tend to revolve around their 
personality.
Urban–Rural Distinctions
The third and final factor considered in this study is region. Scholars have 
noted that more nationally and policy-oriented forms of politics tend to cor-
respond with urbanization, whereas personalistic, candidate-centered politi-
cal styles are more common in rural areas (Cheeseman & Paget, 2014; Cross 
& Young, 2015). This urban–rural distinction may reflect differences in 
forms of communication and social relations. In urban areas with transient 
populations, communication may be more impersonal than in rural areas, 
where local events and networks of families who have lived in the area for 
generations provide more opportunities for personalized communication and 
campaigning (Eder, Jenny, & Müller, 2015). If a rural–urban divide affects 
voter interests and styles of campaign-related communications and social 
relations, we can expect rural campaigns to be more candidate-centric and 
personalistic, with candidates exhibiting a down-to-earth, casual style. In 
contrast, we can expect urban campaigns to place more emphasis on national 
policies and parties, with candidates presenting themselves in a more formal, 
professional style.
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Campaigns in Thailand
Historically, politics in Thailand has been local. Constituency candidates and 
regional factions have dominated politics, and political parties have been 
small, weak, and nonideological (Chambers & Croissant, 2010; Hicken, 
2009; Kuhona, 2015; McCargo, 1997; Ockey, 2004). Parties were banned in 
the country’s first election in 1933, and not until the 1970s did party member-
ship became mandatory for MPs. Thai parties formed around a single person-
ality, small groups of party founders and financiers, or regional factions 
headed by provincial bosses. National mass parties, with elaborate organiza-
tional structures and connections to important social groups, did not develop. 
As a result, Thailand has had a fragmented set of small, unstable parties. If a 
party was not dismantled by one of Thailand’s many military coups, it fre-
quently fell apart due to internal conflicts or the demise of the founding 
leader.
The weakness of parties and the relative strength of local candidates and 
factions were reflected in Thai campaigns. First, parties relied heavily on fac-
tions and candidates to mobilize their local, personal electoral networks 
(Ockey, 2003). Accordingly, campaigns were candidate-centric. Candidates’ 
personal characteristics (looks, charm, education) and achievements (con-
stituent service and political patronage) were of prime importance for elec-
toral success (Callahan & McCargo, 1996, pp. 388-389; Siripan, 2006, pp. 
124-129). Second, party labels held little value in determining vote choice, as 
demonstrated by the fact that candidates regularly switched parties before 
elections with minimal effect on their electability (Hicken, 2013, p. 200). 
Third, parties did not campaign based on ideology8 or national policy plat-
forms (Hicken, 2006, p. 389; Ockey, 2003, pp. 670-671). Parties had a good 
reason for their lack of substantive underpinnings; it helped them to hold 
factions together and positioned them to be able to join any type of coalition 
government.
Thailand’s fragmented system of weak parties, with strong candidates and 
regional factions, was widely viewed as a major problem among academics, 
civil society activists, and the media. The system resulted in short-lived par-
ties and unstable coalition governments. The Asian financial crisis gave 
reformers an opportunity to push through extensive changes as part of the 
adoption of Thailand’s 1997 constitution despite reservations by the major 
parties and factions. The reforms aimed to reduce the power of provincial 
politicians and factions and their corrupt practices, and to promote fewer, 
stronger, nationally oriented political parties with meaningful labels. To 
strengthen parties, the new constitution replaced a block-vote system (with 
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one to three seats per constituency) with 400 single-seat constituencies, 
added a second tier of 100 seats using PR from closed national party lists, 
barred politicians from switching parties during the election period, and pro-
vided public funding for parties based on membership lists.9
Since the passing of the 1997 constitution, Thailand’s political landscape 
has changed dramatically. New parties founded or supported by a wealthy 
business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, won the 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2011 
elections, based largely on strong support from the vote-rich rural north and 
northeast. It became increasingly difficult for other parties to survive. Only 
the Democrats, with strongholds in the south and among the middle class in 
Bangkok, could compete with Thaksin. The long-running domination of poli-
tics by Thaksin’s parties also resulted in rising political tensions, the forma-
tion of popular protest movements (both in support of and against Thaksin), 
street demonstrations, and violence.
It has been well documented that the 1997 constitution resulted in fewer 
political parties,10 but how have electoral campaigns changed? Some research 
has continued to focus on the local, personalistic nature of Thai campaigns 
and politics, emphasizing the enduring importance of regional factions, can-
didates, and personal networks (Chambers, 2008; Chambers & Croissant, 
2010; Chattharakul, 2010). Meanwhile, other studies have emphasized the 
rising importance of national-level considerations. First, some works have 
noted the rising popularity, organizational skills, and personalistic approach 
of national leaders (Nishizaki, 2011; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008). Second, 
research has suggested the increasing importance of party labels and national 
party platforms in campaigns (Hicken, 2013; Sinpeng & Kuhonta, 2012; 
Siripan, 2006). Thus, it now appears that both local and national levels are 
important in contemporary campaigns in Thailand, but no studies have sys-
tematically measured local and national campaign strategies and used them 
to test key driving factors.
Local and National Campaign Strategies in Thailand
This article examines Thailand’s 2011 national legislative election campaign 
to understand the impact of electoral rules, the size of parties, and urban–
rural differences. Thailand’s mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral 
system offers an ideal opportunity to understand how majoritarian and PR 
systems affect campaigns. In 2011, constituents had two votes—a constitu-
ency vote and a party-list vote. In the first vote, constituents voted for a single 
candidate to represent their constituency, and 375 MPs were elected using a 
majoritarian system, based on single-member districts and first-past-the-post. 
In the second vote, constituents chose a political party. From these votes, 125 
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seats were awarded to parties on a proportional basis. The seats were distrib-
uted to candidates from closed party lists based on a national constituency. 
The high ranking party-list seats were safe seats for parties who expected to 
do well. As a result, they were allocated to party leaders and their potential 
cabinet members.
For several reasons, the Thai case offers a uniquely suitable real-world 
setting in which to compare the impact of majoritarian and PR rules. First, it 
is a mixed system, so we can observe campaigns under majoritarian and PR 
rules in the same country at the same time. Second, compared with other 
mixed systems, the constituency and party-list PR elections in Thailand are 
quite separate; the party-list vote is not used to balance out any disproportion-
ality in the allocation of constituency seats. Third, constituency candidates 
were banned from running concurrently on the party list. Lacking a safe 
party-list seat to fall back on closely reflects the context faced by candidates 
in pure majoritarian systems. Thailand is one of the few mixed system in the 
world with all these features.11
Drawing on the broader literature, I expect that the majoritarian rules used 
to elect constituency MPs in Thailand should foster more local, candidate-
centric campaign appeals. This is because majoritarian rules highlight the 
role of the candidate and offer a clear line of personal accountability. In the 
campaign to elect party-list MPs, I predict more national, party-centered 
campaign appeals, as proportional systems with closed lists and the presence 
of a large national constituency should produce centralized campaigns that 
appeal for votes broadly across the nation.
Forty parties competed in Thailand’s 2011 election, and they can be cate-
gorized as large, medium sized, or small. The differing characteristics of 
these three categories of parties resulted in differences in their national and 
local campaign strategies. The larger parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats, 
were expected to do well in the constituency elections due to their majoritar-
ian rules. However, these parties aimed to form a single-party or coalition 
government, so they needed to pursue wide support to maximize their tally of 
both constituency and party-list seats. As a result, they had a strong incentive 
to centralize their campaigns and promote broad national policies (like gov-
ernment services and infrastructure), their party label, and their leaders. In 
addition, in their personal campaign efforts, candidates affiliated with large 
parties could advance their own electoral success by promoting their party 
affiliation.12 A well-known party label can help candidates to distinguish 
themselves from minor-party candidates and thereby attract votes.
Thailand’s medium-sized parties, such as Bhumjaithai and Chart Pattana, 
were primarily regional in nature, composed of collections of individual poli-
ticians whose constituencies were strongly attracted to them personally. Their 
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official (or de facto) leaders tended to be political dealmakers or provincial 
bosses for their constituency candidates, rather than inspirational party voices 
who could energize voters. Unappealing leadership has inhibited the devel-
opment of strong party labels, as has the nonideological nature of these par-
ties, and the transactional way in which they operate—often selling 
themselves to the highest bidder to gain a place within a coalition govern-
ment. For these reasons, I expect these parties to downplay the party label and 
its leadership when competing for constituency and party-list seats. If they 
play to their strengths, their campaigns should focus more on their candi-
dates’ images and on policy messages that resonate with the regions.
Compared with the larger parties, small parties lack both a strong party 
label and popular constituency candidates. As a result, they are not competi-
tive in constituency elections. However, the party-list vote offers them an 
opportunity, since winning a sprinkling of party-list votes across the country 
can be enough to secure one or more party-list seats. Although this is gener-
ally true for small parties around the world, small parties in Thailand differ in 
other ways. Compared with their counterparts in the West, small Thai parties 
tend not to be founded by like-minded politicians and committed activists 
around particular issues neglected by mainstream parties. Rather, like Chuwit 
Kamolvisit’s Rak Thailand, they are usually founded and bankrolled by 
opportunistic politicians with short-term goals of gaining a seat for the party 
leader and at most a few other seats in parliament. They often lack the exper-
tise, interest, or time to formulate a policy platform or develop a party label. 
The one strength they can easily play on, though, is their leader’s name rec-
ognition. As a result, these parties can be expected to focus on the party-list 
election and to campaign primarily on the leader’s image.
In sum, I expect to find that large parties run national campaigns promi-
nently featuring their leaders, national policies, and the party label. Medium-
sized parties can be expected to downplay the party and its leader, focusing 
instead on its candidates and policies relating to regions. Finally, small par-
ties will focus largely on the party-list election with campaigns that revolve 
primarily around the image of the party leader.
There is also reason to believe that the local or national orientation of 
campaigns will vary by region in Thailand. Anek Laothamatas (1996) 
described Thailand as having two major categories of voters. Rural voters, he 
argued, are not influenced by policy appeals or the national interest; they vote 
for candidates who can bring jobs, money, and public works to their villages. 
On the contrary, middle-class Bangkok voters view patronage-style politicians 
as corrupt and are more interested in policies and issues. Similarly, other 
scholars have highlighted urban–rural differences in candidate leadership 
styles.13 In inner-city urban areas, it is believed that voters prefer candidates 
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who are sophisticated and refined; as a result, candidates present themselves 
as privileged elites—articulate, well-educated, and polite. In contrast, rural 
voters are viewed as admiring candidates who can appeal to the common man 
and local interests, so candidates seek to portray themselves as spirited, loyal, 
charming, and down-to-earth.
Measuring Campaign Appeals From Election 
Posters
To study campaign strategies in Thailand’s 2011 parliamentary election, I 
draw on an original collection of election posters and develop innovative 
methods to analyze their content. Election posters can contain a wealth of 
both textual and visual information on parties, party leaders, candidates, 
favored policies, identity appeals, endorsements, and calls to action. The few 
existing systematic studies of election posters have found that they promote 
core campaign messages, raise the visibility and name recognition of leaders 
and candidates, and increase political participation (Dumitrescu, 2010, 2012; 
Kam & Zechmeister, 2013; Panagopoulos, 2009). Unfortunately, all these 
studies have drawn on limited sets of posters from advanced Western democ-
racies. No large systematic research on poster campaigns has occurred in an 
emerging democracy where posters remain one of the dominant campaign 
tools for both large and small parties.14 Through my own observations, I have 
found that Thai election posters are usually designed around candidates, lead-
ers, and core campaign messages. A low-cost medium election posters blan-
ket the country and create a carnival-like atmosphere during elections. Poster 
designs are also reprinted as press advertisements. Constituents, bloggers, 
and journalists regularly critique and comment on posters, while the poster 
messages can be heard repeatedly in the stump speeches of candidates and 
party leaders.
Beyond their importance in campaigns, posters are an ideal source of data 
for a study on the local and national orientation of campaigns. First, they con-
tain local and/or national campaign appeal content that can be coded relatively 
easily—that is, candidates’ images and personal campaign appeals versus 
national policy appeals, party leaders, slogans, and labels. Second, posters can 
be compared across political parties, regions, and, in the Thai case, even across 
electoral rule types. This is because some Thai posters were designed to appeal 
for party-list votes and others for constituency votes. Finally, election posters 
are a primary source, containing unmediated real-world appeals. They thus 
offer some methodological advantages over postelection surveys that ask can-
didates about their campaign activities, because one cannot assume that the 
candidates will be fully transparent or even truthful in their responses.15
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Posters were photographed in four main regions: Bangkok, the north, the 
northeast, and the south. These regions were selected because they varied in 
their level of support for the different political parties and provided reasonable 
coverage of both urban and rural constituencies.16 Photographing took place 
during the last three weeks of Thailand’s 2011 election. Using various forms 
of transportation, I randomly crisscrossed the four regions and individually 
photographed and geocoded every poster I saw on the street. By doing so, I 
created a data set of 12,114 posters from 34 constituencies—four in Bangkok 
and 10 each in the north, northeast, and south.17 Most constituency candidates 
and parties each produced a number of posters with different designs and cam-
paign messages. Each poster was then reprinted and posted in multiple locali-
ties. As a result, I often photographed the same poster in different locations. 
For coding purposes, I selected one image of each uniquely designed poster, 
resulting in a data set of 588 nonduplicated poster images.
Relying on a codebook, four coders identified textual and visual elements 
in the posters that related to candidates, leaders, policies, party labels, and 
slogans.18 Using specialized software, coders precisely traced around the out-
line of these elements and coded them (see Figure 1). The type of clothing 
worn by politicians was also coded. For reliability, the traced selections were 
checked by another coder for errors, and all policy statements were coded by 
two different persons.19 Any inconsistencies in the coding were discussed 
among the group to reach agreement on the correct code.
Figure 1. Samples of campaign posters with elements outlined and coded.
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For the main analysis, the prominence of local politics in campaigns was 
measured by the extent to which candidates were featured in the posters. 
Specifically, I calculated the percentage of poster space occupied by visual 
images and personal references to candidates. Personal references included 
any titles, references to candidate traits and attributes, and personal messages 
relating to the local constituency or on what the candidate had personally 
done or would do in the future. I termed this category of information candi-
date image.
To capture the relevance of national politics in campaigns, I measured the 
prominence of leaders, policies, slogans, and party labels. First, I defined 
leader image as the percentage of poster space occupied by images of and 
personal references to party leaders. The second measure was policy, defined 
as the percentage of space dedicated to policy-relevant messages and related 
images. Each policy-relevant message or image was coded according to one 
specific policy category, such as transportation, jobs, or farming. For a mes-
sage to be coded as policy, it needed to have some level of specificity. The 
third measure of national politics was the percentage of space taken up by 
slogans. Slogans differ from policies in that they are not easily classified 
according to particular policy categories. Nevertheless, they can be consid-
ered part of national politics because they represent broad statements on the 
party’s larger goals (e.g., change, continued progress, or peace and prosper-
ity) and were printed on numerous posters across the country. Two separate 
approaches were used for the final measure, party label. First, I measured the 
space on posters dedicated to the party logo and any mentions of the party 
name; second, I coded whether candidates and leaders wore party clothing, as 
identified by the party’s colors or logo.
This completed the coding process for the 588 nonduplicated poster 
images. I then assigned the measures from each of these posters to all other 
posters with the same design, regardless of the location in which they were 
photographed. This resulted in a final data set of 12,114 fully coded posters.
For the statistical analysis, I analyzed poster campaigns rather than indi-
vidual posters. There are two types of poster campaigns—those by constitu-
ency candidates seeking SMP votes and those by political parties seeking PR 
votes. For both categories, I engaged in some aggregation to create the final 
dependent variables. In the case of a constituency candidate, I took all of his 
or her constituency posters (including reprints posted in different locations) 
and averaged the percentage of space dedicated to each poster element (can-
didate image, leader image, policy, slogan, and party label). In this way, I 
obtained measures of poster campaigns for 141 constituency candidates. In 
the case of political parties, I calculated the average space of poster elements 
from all their party-list posters in each particular constituency. This gave me 
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multiple campaign measures across the country for each party. For example, 
for Pheu Thai, I obtained 30 sets of measures for leader image, one for each 
of the 30 constituencies where they displayed party-list posters. In all, I col-
lected 240 distinct observations of party campaigns across different electoral 
districts.20
Using poster campaigns as the unit of analysis has a number of advan-
tages. First, it fits with the logic of the argument, which focuses on how, as a 
whole, candidates or parties campaign. Second, it helps to reduce potential 
bias resulting from the fact that certain candidates or parties may have very 
large numbers of posters in the data set. Each candidate or party with posters 
in a given district was weighted equally. Third, this method allows for par-
ticular posters that were posted in many locations across a constituency by a 
candidate (or party) to be more heavily weighted in the candidate’s (or par-
ty’s) campaign measures. Because it is reasonable to infer that the messages 
on these posters were considered particularly important, giving them greater 
weight helps to improve the meaningfulness of the campaign measures. 
Finally, this method enables us to test whether the party campaigns vary 
across the country by creating multiple district-level measures for each party-
list campaign.
To analyze the impact of electoral rules, I compared the constituency and 
party campaigns. For the statistical analysis, I created an election variable, 
which was equal to 1 for party campaigns (PR rules) and 0 for constituency 
campaigns (SMP rules). To examine the influence of political parties, I com-
pared campaigns across large, medium-sized, and small parties. The size of a 
party was based on the number of constituencies in which each party ran a 
candidate. Large parties put forward candidates in all 375 constituencies, 
medium-sized parties competed in at least 40% (150) of the constituencies, 
and small parties competed in fewer than 40%. This measure is a reasonable 
indicator of the size of a party’s organization and campaign capacity. Although 
the 40% threshold was somewhat arbitrary, it appeared to capture the gener-
ally recognized distinctions between party sizes. Pheu Thai and the Democrats 
were the two large parties; Bhumjaithai, Chart Pattana Puea Pandin, Chart 
Thai Pattana, and the New Aspiration Party qualified as medium-sized par-
ties, with the remainder, including Rak Thailand, Social Action, Matubhum, 
and Rak Santi among others, being classified as small. Overall, 40% of the 
posters from the total data set were produced by large parties, 32% by 
medium-sized parties, and 28% by small parties. Alternative measures of 
party size based on the number of party members, the size of campaign bud-
gets, or past electoral performance were either infeasible or inferior.21 Finally, 
to study any regional effects, campaigns were coded according to where they 
occurred, that is, in the north, northeast, south, or Bangkok.
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Findings
For the statistical analysis, I first performed regressions on each of the five 
dependent variables (candidate image, leader image, policy, slogan, and party 
label) on all campaigns. I then segmented the data and ran regressions on 
constituency campaigns and party-list campaigns. All regressions used ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors (Table 1). A number of 
alternative models and robustness checks were performed, and their results 
aligned with the statistical findings presented below.22
Electoral Rules
Majoritarian rules and local campaigns. In view of the electoral rules, I first 
expected that majoritarian rules would foster local and candidate-centered 
campaign appeals more strongly than PR rules. The statistical findings from 
the poster campaigns supported this hypothesis. Party-list poster campaigns 
had 29% less space dedicated to the candidate image than constituency post-
ers. Virtually all constituency posters in the data set featured a large image of 
the local constituency candidate, and many included messages referencing 
the candidate and his or her constituency. Popular messages included being 
female, honest, hardworking, caring, and a native of the constituency.
In many posters, party leaders were featured in a box above the candidate 
or in photographs with the candidate. They largely played a supporting role 
in the posters, helping candidates to gather votes from middle-class voters 
who based their evaluations on national platforms and leaders rather than on 
the merits of constituency candidates (Chattharakul, 2010). Constituency 
posters usually included a general party slogan, but they rarely promoted 
their party’s policies. In addition, the prominence of the party label was 
somewhat smaller than on party-list posters. In sum, the constituency posters 
promoted the local candidate’s image, personal messages, and affiliation with 
party leaders.
PR rules and national campaigns. In contrast, I expected that the PR rules 
would foster national and party-centered campaign appeals. Statistical evi-
dence showed that, on these posters, more space was dedicated to the leader 
image, policy, slogans, and party label (Table 1). The appearance of candi-
dates on party-list posters was far more limited than on constituency posters. 
Importantly, those list candidates who did appear on posters were often well-
known individuals who could draw broad support based on their personal 
image: high-profile party members, contenders for ministerial posts, celebrities, 
and sports stars. For example, Chart Pattana Puea Pandin featured soccer 
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stars and Olympic medalists who were among their party-list candidates. 
This observation offers a twist on theoretical expectations. In closed-list PR 
systems with a large constituency, list candidates have very strong incen-
tives to campaign on a party reputation rather than their personal reputation 
(Carey & Shugart, 1995). However, findings from the posters indicate that 
parties actually recruited specific party-list candidates and promoted their 
personal reputation (i.e., their celebrity status) to foster national party 
support.
Compared with the constituency posters, leader images were more com-
mon and often much larger on party-list posters. Many party-list posters were 
designed to exclusively feature and promote the party leader, often with an 
enlarged photo, some reference to the leader’s experience, and a call to vote 
for the leader as the next prime minister. Party-list posters also frequently 
promoted policy messages, often with policy statements filling the whole 
poster. These brief policy messages served to reinforce the more detailed ver-
sions distributed through the media, television, and campaign speeches. 
Posters also used images to reinforce policy messages. These images included 
inanimate objects (e.g., trains, roads, car keys, and automatic teller machines) 
as well as the groups of people at whom the policies were aimed, such as 
farmers, students, civil service workers, construction workers, the elderly, 
and local merchants. See Figure 1 (center and right) for two examples. 
Slogans and the party label were also more prominent on the party-list post-
ers as expected, but only marginally so.
In line with these findings, other scholars have observed how Thai cam-
paigns have become increasingly centralized around national party leaders in 
recent years. Leaders are playing larger and more crucial roles in candidate 
selection, party communications, strategy, finance, and policy formulation 
(Chambers & Croissant, 2010; Siripan, 2006, pp. 121-145). Other scholars 
have observed the prominent use of policy in the 2011 Thai election and, 
more broadly, a rise in party-centered campaigns since 2001. Recent Thai 
campaigns have incorporated more detailed and elaborate national program-
matic policy platforms, and some researchers have noted their particular 
importance for the party-list vote (Chattharakul, 2010, p. 70; Hicken, 2006, 
pp. 15-16; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 67; Sinpeng & Kuhonta, 2012, pp. 
393-395). Although these insights are reflected in the poster campaigns, the 
systematic comparison of constituency and party-list poster campaigns offers 
the clearest and most concrete evidence that the national orientation of cam-
paigns is largely driven by the electoral rules—specifically, the use of closed-
list PR with a national constituency. Meanwhile, majoritarian rules have 
continued to foster a more local orientation, with campaigns focusing on the 
image and personal messages of local constituency candidates.
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Political Parties
In addition to the electoral rules, political party size also played an important 
role in shaping campaigns. The number of posters posted during the election 
indicates that, as expected, the smaller parties focused primarily on the PR 
elections. Among small parties’ posters in the full data set, 78% were designed 
to appeal for party-list votes, compared with 60% for medium-sized and 40% 
for large parties. Moreover, the strongest party, Pheu Thai, had the lowest 
proportion of party-list posters (34%), followed by the Democrats with 46%. 
In sum, as the size of Thai parties declined, campaign activity shifted toward 
appealing for the party-list vote.
Candidate and leader images. In comparing the use of politician images across 
parties, I expected that small parties would dedicate the most space to their 
leader’s image whereas medium-sized parties would dedicate the least 
amount. The statistical results supported these expectations. Medium-sized 
parties dedicated little space to leaders in both their constituency and party-
list posters. Meanwhile, large and small parties emphasized their leaders to a 
similar extent in constituency posters, but in party-list posters, leaders of 
small parties were significantly more prominent.
The Rak Thailand Party is one example of a small party that campaigned 
for the party-list vote based on the image of its leader and founder, Chuwit 
Kamolvisit. A colorful character and massage parlor owner, Chuwit focused 
on promoting his personal image, hoping to win election by picking up a 
sprinkling of party-list votes across the country. He appealed to people disil-
lusioned with politics by presenting himself as an angry man with a single 
mission: to scrutinize government. He filled his posters with his image, over-
laid with humorous messages criticizing Thai politicians as dishonest and 
corrupt. Beyond that agenda, he had no policy platform. In mobilizing voters, 
he downplayed the party name, opting instead for “Vote for Chuwit” and 
displaying the party number prominently. Chuwit was not alone in this 
approach; other minor notables with sufficient resources to sponsor a national 
campaign centered on their own image took advantage of the party-list PR 
system and used small parties as their personal election machines.
Medium-sized parties severely downplayed their leaders in posters. These 
leaders tended to be unpopular or relatively unknown and often served as 
proxies for banned politicians who continued to control the party from behind 
the scenes. In the absence of popular well-known leaders to give a face to the 
party, they recruited celebrities and sports stars for their party list and used 
those widely recognized figures’ images to promote the party. Contrary to expec-
tations, however, the images of their constituency candidates, while more 
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prominent than those of large-party candidates, did not differ significantly in 
size compared with those of small-party candidates. Finally, the images of 
candidates from the large parties were the least prominent. As argued, this is 
because these parties and their candidates had strong incentives to promote a 
greater focus on the national party and its more national party-centered ele-
ments—specifically their leaders and policies.23
Policies and slogans. Whereas small parties focused most heavily on leader 
image, I expected the larger parties to emphasize policy. The statistical find-
ings supported this prediction as well. Again, the trend was strongest for the 
party-list vote, where medium-sized and large parties dedicated 17% and 
21% more space, respectively, to policy when compared with the small 
parties.
In terms of the types of policies promoted, scholars have observed how 
Thai parties have gotten on the bandwagon of Thaksin-inspired populist poli-
cies in recent years (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2013; Sinpeng & Kuhonta, 2012; 
Siripan, 2006). Unfortunately, little systematic research has been done on 
how Thai policy platforms vary. Figure 2 shows the average percentage of 
space devoted to different policies across parties in the party-list posters. 
Even though the Democrats had criticized Thaksin’s pro-poor policies as 
populist in previous election campaigns, the policies that they presented in 
2011 were remarkably similar to those of Pheu Thai. Both parties largely 
focused on public goods, such as government services and infrastructure, as 
well as on employment and farming. The policy proposals promoted by 
medium-sized parties also included plans to increase employment, but they 
differed by stressing primarily access to consumer goods and increasing 
regional revenues. These differences indicate that in terms of types of policy, 
large parties were more nationally oriented whereas medium-sized parties 
were more regionally oriented. As the medium-sized parties had regional 
strongholds, these approaches make strategic sense.
Although the size of the slogans varied only slightly across parties, the 
actual content of the slogans was more interesting. Slogans from the large 
parties often emphasized the importance of policy and service—for example, 
“proceed with policies for the future” (Democrats) and “we are ready to serve 
the people” (Pheu Thai). In contrast, many of the other parties used their 
slogans to more directly confront the deeply divisive nature of Thai politics, 
casting themselves as honest and fair brokers who would facilitate compro-
mise and an end to the bitter rivalries.24
Party label. Contrary to my expectations, the statistical analysis showed that 
large parties promoted their party label less than small parties. The difference 
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was statistically significant though relatively small, at only 2%. However, 
this measurement was based on the space devoted to the party’s logo or name. 
Arguably, a more meaningful way to investigate the importance of the party 
label would be to consider whether candidates and leaders wore recognizable 
party clothing (distinguished by the party’s color and/or logo) in the posters. 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of posters in which politicians wore party 
clothing for each party size. Party clothing was most prevalent among con-
stituency candidates from the large parties. Almost 80% of Democrat and 
Pheu Thai constituency candidates wore party clothing, compared with 20% 
of medium-sized party candidates and almost no candidates from the small 
parties. In addition, the two leaders of the large parties, Yingluck and Abhisit, 
were more likely to wear party clothing than other party leaders. Overall, 
candidates and leaders from large parties promoted the party label while the 
other parties downplayed it.
Figure 2. Policies promoted on the party-list posters by party size (n = 7,151).
Posters from large parties = 1,963, from medium-sized parties = 2,565, and from small  
parties = 2,623.
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Elitist or casual style. Although I had no theoretical expectations in this regard, 
the analysis of the posters revealed some substantial variation across parties 
in terms of politicians’ choice of casual or formal clothing. Figure 4 shows 
the percentage of posters with various types of clothing worn by constituency 
candidates across parties. Candidates from small and medium-sized parties 
favored government uniforms and formal business suits,25 by which they pro-
jected an elitist image of authority, power, status, and wealth. In contrast, 
most candidates from the large parties (who would win the vast majority of 
the seats) wore casual or semicasual clothing, projecting an image as easygo-
ing and down-to-earth.
Variation in clothing among party leaders was more leader-specific. In 
most of the posters, Yingluck wore a formal suit. New to politics, she pre-
sented a credible image that aligned with her professional business back-
ground.26 However, her Democrat opponent, Abhisit, largely presented 
himself as a down-to-earth leader, engaged with regular Thai voters. In half 
of the posters in which Abhisit appeared, he was dressed casually. Numerous 
Figure 3. Percentage of posters with politicians wearing party clothing (N = 12,114).
Posters from large parties = 4,869, from medium-sized parties = 3,884, and from small  
parties = 3,361.
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posters featured him in an open shirt, conversing and joking with farmers in 
the fields, workers on construction sites, or gatherings of students (e.g., see 
Figure 1, center). This was clearly an effort to soften his elitist public persona 
and craft a more friendly, humble image.27 Abhisit was not alone in this strat-
egy; many leaders from the small parties also presented themselves as down-
to-earth leaders through their casual clothing.
The perceived value of a common-person style of campaigning is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon in Thai politics. It represents a shift away from an 
elitist campaign style and is closely associated with Thaksin’s populist turn 
since his initial success in the 2001 election. In analyzing that election, 
Ockey (n.d.) found that candidates primarily demonstrated their authority 
and high status on their election posters; the entrepreneur’s business suit was 
a very common type of clothing, and images of candidates serving constitu-
ents were very rare. In their study of the same election, Phongpaichit and 
Baker (2008) noted the formal way in which Thaksin presented himself to 
Figure 4. Type of clothing worn by constituency candidates by party size.
There were 4,919 constituency posters with images of constituency candidates—2,926 
from large parties, 1,255 from medium-sized parties, and 738 from small parties. Sixty-four 
constituency posters had no constituency candidate image. The semicasual category included 
candidates wearing a casual jacket and a tie. “Casual” included candidates wearing casual 
sporting clothing, or a shirt with or without a casual jacket but no tie.
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the public, dressed in a business suit and peppering his speech with English 
words. Following this electoral success, Thaksin changed to a more informal 
man-of-the-people style, using colloquial language in his speeches and 
dressing in an open shirt rather than a suit. Case study evidence also indi-
cates that more candidates have adopted a down-to-earth, easygoing, casual 
style in recent elections (Chattharakul, 2010, pp. 87-89). Although this shift 
is partly due to Thaksin’s populism, the professionalization of campaigns, 
and marketing efforts to connect with constituents, it also reflects broader 
socioeconomic changes and the breakdown of traditional hierarchies and 
forms of authority.28
In conclusion, both the statistical analysis and a qualitative examination of 
the posters indicate that party size affects how Thai parties campaign. Large 
parties’ campaigns were centralized, party-centered, and nationally oriented, 
actively seeking both party-list and constituency votes. Large parties cam-
paigned on national policies and on the image of their leader, whereas their 
constituency candidates drew most heavily on the party’s label while cam-
paigning in a casual easy-going style. The content of medium-sized party 
campaigns placed little emphasis on the party label or leader. These parties 
promoted the celebrity image of their party-list candidates and policies that 
would benefit regional constituencies. Their constituency candidates drew on 
their status as local government officials or business entrepreneurs. Finally, 
the campaigns of small parties were centered on the personalistic image of 
the party leader and primarily sought party-list votes. They offered virtually 
no policies, and the few constituency candidates whom they put forward pre-
sented themselves as independent business entrepreneurs.
Region
Finally, I turn to the rural–urban distinction. Based on prior literature, I 
expected rural campaigns to be more candidate-centric and personalistic 
while urban campaigns focused more extensively on national policies and 
parties. Findings from the statistical analysis shown in Table 1 offer no sup-
port for this prediction. Overall, the amount of space dedicated to candidates, 
leaders, policy, and party labels showed no consistent urban–rural differ-
ences. However, there was some support for the second expectation, namely, 
that rural candidates would exhibit a down-to-earth casual style while candi-
dates in the urban area of Bangkok would present themselves in a more for-
mal style. Figure 5 shows the percentage of constituency candidates wearing 
different types of clothing in urban and rural constituencies. The main differ-
ence was that Bangkok candidates preferred to present themselves in formal 
suits whereas rural candidates from the north, northeast, and south preferred 
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more informal dress.29 The use of casual clothing in rural regions reflects a 
higher degree of personalism relative to the high-status orientation of formal 
clothing in Bangkok.
Despite this difference, the evidence overall suggests that regional differ-
ences have less of an impact on Thai campaigns than do electoral rules and 
the size of political parties. The lack of regional difference might be 
explained by other factors that have undermined urban–rural distinctions in 
recent years: the increasing centralization of election campaigns, the spread 
of Internet communications across the country, and the fact that many rural 
Thais migrate to Bangkok to work for part of the year but still vote in their 
rural province.30
Conclusion
Pheu Thai won the election convincingly with 265 (53%) of the 500 seats,31 
and Yingluck went on to become Thailand’s first female prime minister. The 
Democrat Party won a disappointing 159 seats and became the main opposi-
tion party. The medium-sized parties fared worse than expected,32 underper-
forming in constituency elections in their regional strongholds and not doing 
much better in the party-list PR election. Voters looked primarily to the large 
national parties in the party-list vote, and most also voted for the national 
party’s constituency candidate. The lack of vote splitting compared with 
Figure 5. Type of clothing worn by constituency candidates in urban and rural 
regions (n = 4,919).
3,989 posters were from the three rural regions (north, northeast, south) and 930 were from 
Bangkok.
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previous elections indicates that national party labels, platforms, and viable 
leaders are increasingly aiding the electoral success of major-party constitu-
ency candidates. For the small parties, the tactic of largely focusing on the 
party-list PR election proved relatively successful. Chuwit Kamolvisit, who 
pursued this strategy with rigor, shocked many (including himself) by win-
ning four party-list seats. Several other small parties picked up one party-list 
seat each but no constituency seats.33
This article has important implications for both theory and elections in 
emerging democracies. First, it presents evidence that aligns with theoretical 
expectations on the divergent effects of electoral rules on campaigns. Majoritarian 
rules fostered campaigns that promoted the image of local candidates, 
whereas closed-list PR rules encouraged centralized and nationalized cam-
paigns around party labels, policies, and leaders. These findings can inform 
approaches to either strengthening local representation and accountability or 
fostering more national and programmatic representation. The mixture of 
campaign styles observed in the 2011 election illustrates that Thailand’s 
mixed system provided incentives for candidates and parties to appeal to both 
local interests and national priorities.34
Second, the evidence shows that large parties and their candidates are 
campaigning nationally, centralizing their campaigns around their party label 
and national policies and pursuing both constituency and party-list votes. The 
rise of two large parties that campaign on national platforms has fostered 
partisan identities, reduced vote splitting, and resulted in higher margins of 
victories in most electoral constituencies (Hicken, 2013; Phongpaichit & 
Baker, 2013, pp. 607-608). This national orientation has had some positive 
implications for the conduct of elections. The decline in the number of close 
races has diminished the utility of vote buying35 and electoral violence. 
Accordingly, Kongkirati (2014) observed fewer incidences of violence in 
recent elections.
Although we might expect these large national parties to institutionalize 
and begin to look more like the mass parties of the West, with extensive inter-
nal organizations, this does not appear to be the case. Serious efforts to 
develop party structures or local branches or to broaden the base of commit-
ted party members have been lacking (Croissant & Chambers, 2010; Siripan, 
2006). Instead, Pheu Thai and the Democrats have become what we could 
call electoral parties.36 They employ public relations agencies and consul-
tants, use modern marketing techniques to identify constituents’ demands and 
opinions, and promote policy platforms and the image of the party leader 
through the media.37 Professionalization has enabled these parties to maintain 
a centralized, top-down organizational approach and largely avoid participa-
tory involvement by ordinary supporters while still establishing a solid social 
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base and partisan support (Hicken, 2013; Hicken & Selway, 2012). In this 
way, Thailand’s national parties have drawn on professional campaign tech-
niques to leapfrog the mass party stage that has characterized party develop-
ment in the West. This observation fits with other research indicating that 
parties do not always evolve through similar stages but, rather, are products 
of their unique social, political, and technological circumstances (Bartolini & 
Mair, 2001).
The third main finding concerns the behavior of small parties. Although 
Thailand’s party system has increasingly moved toward a two-party system, 
small parties can still compete with some success in the party-list PR elec-
tion. Some of them did so in 2011 by centralizing their campaign around the 
personalistic image of their leader. This strategy contrasts starkly with that of 
small parties in the West (particularly Europe), which often emphasize 
strongly held positions on particular policies or issues in their campaigns. 
The personalistic nature of small parties has important implications for 
emerging democracies like Thailand. Whereas policy-oriented small parties 
in the West can engender a more inclusive democracy by offering alternative 
views and promoting issues ignored by mainstream parties, these benefits are 
lost when small parties become merely personal vehicles for opportunistic 
political leaders.
Finally, Thai politics rarely stands still. Political disputes, the issue of 
amnesty for Thaksin, and his potential return to Thailand resulted in yet 
another military coup in 2014. After being removed from office, Yingluck 
and other members of her government faced criminal charges relating to a 
failed rice subsidy scheme. Expecting to receive a jail sentence, Yingluck 
fled Thailand before her verdict was announced. In preparation for new elec-
tions, Thailand’s military government forced through a new constitution 
without any public debate. The changes give the military the power to shape 
any new government, weaken political parties, and undermine their incen-
tives to pursue national policy development. The next elections will reveal 
the impact of this political restructuring on campaigns in Thailand.
Author’s Note
The appendix, codebook, sample posters, and replication package (with all data and 
code) are available from the author’s website, www.colmfox.com.
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Notes
 1. Other authors have effectively used mixed electoral systems to study the effect 
of majoritarian and PR rules, such as Moser and Scheiner (2004) and Stratmann 
and Baur (2002).
 2. Increasingly, parties try to accommodate voter preferences in their policy appeals 
while remaining consistent with the party’s platform (Farrell & Webb, 2002).
 3. Centralizing personalization means that power flows up to a leader, whereas in 
the decentralizing variant, power flows down to individual politicians below the 
executive (Balmas, Rahat, Sheafer, & Shenhav, 2014).
 4. Exceptions include Karvonen (2010) and Cross and Young (2015). For a review 
of literature on personalization in media coverage of elections, see van Aelst, 
Sheafer, and Stanyer (2012).
 5. Single-member plurality systems with primaries, the single nontransferable 
vote, the single transferable vote, and the block vote can also foster intraparty 
competition.
 6. See Gunther and Diamond (2003) for a typology of political parties.
 7. Kirchheimer (1966) developed the catch-all party concept based on the evolution 
of centralized Western European socialist parties. Panebianco (1988) developed 
the broader concept of an “electoral-professional party.”
 8. Ockey (1994, p. 256) noted that left-oriented parties were active during brief 
periods in the 1950s and 1970s but were violently suppressed in coups.
 9. For more detailed discussion on the goals and consequences of the 1997 consti-
tution, see Hicken (2006, 2009, 2013), Kuhonta (2008), and Ockey (2003).
10. The effective number of parties nationally dropped from seven in 1996 to 2.3 in 
2005 (Hicken, 2013, pp. 202-203).
11. Ukraine, South Korea, and Taiwan are the other contemporary cases.
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12. Party affiliation has been found to be an important tool for candidates and voters 
(Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1991).
13. Chattharakul (2010, p. 88) compared the more refined urban phudi style with the 
rural nakleng style.
14. The one exception is my own work on poster campaigns in Indonesian elections, 
see Fox (2014).
15. Candidate surveys are a common approach in research on candidates’ campaigns. 
For example, see Karlsen and Skogerbø (2015) and Zittel and Gschwend (2008).
16. Beyond the technical difficulties involved in creating a random sampling strat-
egy for posters that can be displayed on any road across the country, the limited 
time frame of the campaign and the travel time required made collecting a truly 
random sample infeasible.
17. The regions, provinces, and number of constituencies were as follows: Central: 
Bangkok (4); north: Chiang Mai (4), Chiang Rai (3), Nakhon Sawan (1), 
Phitsanulok (2); northeast: Loei (4), Nong Bua Lamphu (3), Udon Thani (3); and 
south: Pattani (4), Songkhla (4), Yala (2).
18. After I developed the codebook, it was tested and refined by coders before coding 
began. Poster content that could not be clearly defined as having a local or national 
orientation—for example, calls to action and educational messages on the voting 
procedure—was not coded. The detailed codebook is available on my website, 
www.colmfox.com.
19. Interreliability tests showed a high degree of agreement: Percentage of agree-
ment, .95; Scott’s pi, .9; Cohen’s kappa, .9; and Krippendorff’s alpha, .9. Slogans 
were coded by the author and a research assistant during a second round of 
coding.
20. Posters that had the name of a constituency candidate and appeared only in the can-
didate’s constituency were defined as constituency posters. Posters that appeared in 
more than one constituency were defined as party-list posters. See the online appen-
dix for a summary of the number of constituency and party-list posters by party.
21. Party membership is small, and members usually are not required to pay dues 
or engage in party activities (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 76). Official party 
budgets vastly underestimate the real costs of campaigns. Finally, splitting, 
merging, and reformulation of Thai parties is routine, confounding any effort to 
measure the size of parties from previous election results.
22. To ensure that the results were not driven by any particular party’s campaign, the 
regressions in Table 1 were rerun multiple times. Each time, I dropped one party 
from the data set to see if the results held up. This process was repeated for each 
of the most prominent large, medium-sized, and small parties in the data set. 
The regressions were also run using the poster as the unit of analysis—both the 
full set of 12,114 posters and the unique set of 588 distinct posters. In all these 
alternative models, the key variables reflected the findings in the main regression 
table, in terms of both statistical significance and coefficient size. See the online 
appendix for the full results and summary statistics.
23. This was in spite of the fact that some context- and party-specific factors may 
have muted the presence of party leaders in the posters. Yingluck was selected 
Fox 1929
very late in the campaign as Pheu Thai’s leader; although she was a likable figure 
and not tainted with corruption, she was still a novice in politics and her appeal 
was untested (Thalang, 2012, p. 635). With regard to Abhisit, Democrat leaders 
tend to be less powerful and entrenched than other Thai party leaders, because 
the Democrats have a formalized process of selecting and replacing leaders and 
make their selections based on personality and leadership qualities, not wealth 
(Chambers & Croissant, 2010).
24. Examples include “we do what we say, brave to do it for Thais” (Bhumjaithai); 
“the middle way is Thai’s alternative way” (Rak Santi); “move forward and 
proceed without blood and violence” (Social Action); and “compromise. reduce 
conflict” (Chart Thai Pattana).
25. Some candidates in the south also chose Islamic clothing to appeal to the pre-
dominantly Muslim electorate.
26. A prominent marketing expert, Songsak Premsuk, was called on to craft 
Yingluck’s public image, particularly in campaign advertisements. For a review 
of reports on Yingluck’s campaign, see Bangkok Pundit (2011).
27. The posters complemented Abhisit’s campaign activities during visits to the 
north and northeast, where he stayed in a temple; assisted a revered monk; and 
chatted with villagers.
28. See Walker (2012) on rural socioeconomic changes and Hewison (2013) on chal-
lenges to hierarchical institutions.
29. There was not much regional variation in leaders’ clothing. In all the posters 
gathered in Bangkok, Yingluck wore a business suit, but she was less formally 
dressed in some posters in the north and northeast. Abhisit was just as likely to 
wear a suit or casual clothing in posters in either Bangkok or the peripheries.
30. Thabchumpon and McCargo (2011, p. 1002) found that the majority of mem-
bers of the Bangkokian pro-Thaksin redshirt movement were migrants who lived 
most of the year in Bangkok but voted in their home provinces.
31. Compared with the 2007 election results, Pheu Thai made gains of between 6% 
and 10% in the party-list vote in all regions except the south, where their vote 
totals remained the same. In the constituency elections, Pheu Thai improved by 
5% and the Democrats improved by 1.5%.
32. Bhumjaithai placed third with 34 seats, Chart Thai Pattana won 19 seats, and 
Chart Pattana Puea Pandin won seven.
33. Matubhum was an exception, winning one constituency seat in Pattani.
34. Shugart and Wattenberg (2003) argued that mixed systems were growing in pop-
ularity, in part, because they offered the best of both worlds in this way.
35. Vote buying is largely a personal method of vote gathering, especially prevalent 
in candidate-centered electoral systems (Hicken, 2007, p. 50). As Thai elections 
have become more party-centered, this tactic has become less useful.
36. McCargo (1997) and more recently Croissant and Chambers (2010) drew on 
Panebianco (1988) to describe the major Thai parties as “electoral-professional” 
or simply “electoral” parties.
37. These techniques are consistent with global trends in modern professional cam-
paigning (Farrell & Webb, 2002; Mancini & Swanson, 1996).
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